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REIMAGINING THE “TEAM FOUR PLAN”  
WITH AN EYE TOWARD  
COMMUNITY COLLABORATION AND  
PRIVATE CAPITAL 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 8, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community Opportunity came together in the city of St. Louis 
to tour North St. Louis.1 Recognized by many as an “historic occasion,”2 
members of Congress met to discuss what is now known as the Team Four 
Plan, the “City Wide Implementation Strategies for the Draft 
Comprehensive Plan” of 1975.3 The notorious city plan had set out to divide 
St. Louis into three parts, urging city officials to abandon and effectively 
extinguish, by way of zoning, code enforcement, and tax policies, areas of 
the City marked “deplet[ed]” 4  and predominantly African American. 5 
Crafted in 1974, the comprehensive report has long been regarded as a 
citywide phantom, frequently discussed as the “secret plan” that continues 
to plague St. Louis politics and local construction.6  This Note seeks to 
explore the historical underpinnings of the Team Four Plan by considering 
St. Louis’s dramatic economic decline alongside a citywide panic regarding 
the fate of the Midwest city. Though it acknowledges Congressional efforts 
to stop the urban plan in its tracks, this Note suggests that the strategy of 
“urban triage”7 presented by Team Four has been largely effectuated in the 
form of Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment 
Act, a piece of legislation initially intended to eradicate “blight” throughout 
 
1. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 
4” Into the Future: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 1, 3 (2008). 
2. Id. at 10 (statement of Terry Kennedy, Alderman, 18th Ward, St. Louis Board of Alderman).  
3. See id. at 3.  
4. See id. at 37; see also TEAM FOUR, INC., CITYWIDE IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: THE 
DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 16 (1975), https://metrostl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-Team-
Four-Plan-1975.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YD4-9RXT]. Today, the areas identified throughout the Plan as 
depleted are those that may be identified as “blighted” areas within the St. Louis region. 
5. See infra Section II.A. 
6. See, e.g., Patrick Cooper-McCann, The Trap of Triage: Lessons from the “Team Four Plan”, 
15 J. PLAN. HIST. 149, 156, 161 (2015). 
7. “To implement urban triage, cities sort neighbourhoods into three policy categories, similar 
to war-time triage: healthy, in-between, and significantly deteriorated.” Deanna H. Schmidt, Urban 
Triage: Saving the Savable Neighbourhoods in Milwaukee, 26 PLAN. PERSPS. 569, 572 (2011).  











the state.8 Mimicking the effects of antiquated, race-blind policies that once 
functioned as a means of maintaining the notorious white “sanctuary” while 
exacerbating the “black urban ghetto,” 9  St. Louis’s transparent yet 
purposeful misapplication of Tax Increment Financing (TIF), typically a 
result of inter-municipal competition for increased tax revenue, perpetuates 
the city’s notorious racial divide. 10  Such a strategy, this Note reveals, 
follows the very intentions of Team Four, advancing affluent neighborhoods 
while neglecting, and thereby sabotaging, low-income communities. 11 
Finally, this Note recognizes the realities of a financially strapped local 
government; a policy of urban triage, despite its inequitable effect, proves 
the most rational of public tactics in light of finite public funds. 
Acknowledging the limited freedom of a fiscally responsible, voter-
conscious municipality, this Note sets forth an alternative means of 
stemming “blight” throughout the St. Louis region: Social Impact Bonds. 
Rejecting TIF funding for its loose “blight” and “but-for” requirements, this 
Note emphasizes the need for public-private collaboration in furtherance of 
social equality and the eradication of St. Louis “blight.” In so doing, this 
Note presents Social Impact Bonds dedicated to the redevelopment of 
historically neglected neighborhoods as a possible alternative to St. Louis’s 
current strategy of urban triage.  
I. THE TEAM FOUR PLAN 
A. Setting the Stage for the Team Four Plan  
In 1870, St. Louis City was booming; functioning as the St. Louis 
region’s “locus of power and civic energy,” the city held approximately 
$148 million in wealth tax whereas St. Louis County held a mere $14 
million. 12  On August 22, 1876, in response to city voters’ growing 
 
8. Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800–
865 (2016). See Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing Reform, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 919 (1999) (recognizing the initial purposes of tax increment financing as deployed 
within Missouri). 
9. See Ernest Calloway, Stratagem for Containment: ‘Depletion’ Designation Would 
Perpetuate City’s Racial Segregation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 21, 1975, at 2D. 
10. For more information regarding the city’s historic and ongoing racial divide, see Chico 
Harlan, In St. Louis, Delmar Boulevard Is the Line That Divides a City by Race and Perspective, WASH. 
POST. (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-st-louis-delmar-boulevard-is-the-l 
ine-that-divides-a-city-by-race-and-perspective/2014/08/22/de692962-a2ba-4f53-8bc3-54f88f848fdb_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/ZBX7-EUAF?type=image]. 
11. See infra Part II.  
12. Jeanette Cooperman, St. Louis’ Great Divorce: A Complete History of the City and County 














frustration with county residents’ influence over urban affairs, St. Louis 
City opted to sever from the county in what is now known as the Great 
Divorce.13 While initially understood as a triumph for urban residents, the 
Great Divorce proved devastating for the City of St. Louis. Squeezed 
between the Mississippi River to the east and the city-county divide to the 
west, the city overcrowded with no room to expand.14  Meanwhile, the 
county was primed for success; the rail line between the city and the 
surrounding St. Louis towns enabled commuter development, allowing city 
residents to escape from the “gritty and unhealthy” nature of the city to the 
“new and exclusive suburbs in the county.”15 Eventually, this trend resulted 
in a draining cityscape. By 1936, true desolation began to emerge; city-
dwellers relocated from the city into the surrounding suburbs, abandoning 
the “historic core” which thereafter consisted of the “black ghetto.”16  
Alarm regarding the neglect and imminent demise of St. Louis City, 
however, did not set in until 1973, when the Rand Corporation published a 
year-long study of St. Louis.17 The report “read like an obituary for the city,” 
sending city officials into a “panic.”18 Though the trends that initiated the 
dramatic decline within St. Louis could be seen throughout the United 
States, the report suggested that St. Louis differed from other cities in its 
“rapid and absolute declines in central City population and business 
 
13. See Andrew Wanko, The Great Divorce, MO HIST. SOC’Y (Aug. 22, 2017), https://mohistory. 
org/blog/the-great-divorce/ [https://perma.cc/E8ZS-7NKZ]. The city-dwellers’ concerns came down to 
issues of taxation; though the city paid approximately half of Missouri’s total taxes, city residents were 
subjected to the will of St. Louis’s sprawling county, made up of small towns and farmers totaling almost 
31,000 residents. See id. Members of the city were weary of allocating money to the county; they simply 
“didn’t want to pay for roads and other amenities for their country cousins.” Maria Altman, St. Louis 
City and St. Louis County: Navigating “The Great Divorce”, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (April 22, 2011, 
6:35 AM), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/st-louis-city-and-st-louis-county-navigating-great-divor 
ce#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/92TT-5UQP]. 
14. Wanko, supra note 13. In the decade following 1950, the county’s population grew by 73%. 
Meanwhile, the City shrunk by 12.5%. Id.  
15. Jodi Rios, Racial States of Municipal Governance: Policing Bodies and Space for Revenue 
in North St. Louis County, MO, 37 LAW & INEQ. 235, 239 (2019). 
16. Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 150.  
17. See Rand Report Calls Future of St. Louis Economically Bleak, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/04/archives/rand-report-calls-future-of-st-louis-economically-bleak 
.html [https://perma.cc/3TLU-FCSX]; Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 153.  
18. George Sells, Benign Neglect: The Team Four Plan’s Legacy in North St. Louis, METROSTL 
(Aug. 9, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.metrostl.com/2019/08/09/benign-neglect/ [https://perma.cc/DE5 
5-CC8G]. Following the Rand Report’s release, city leaders Richard Gephardt and John Roach 
submitted Board Bills 19 and 20 to the Board of Alderman in a misguided effort to save the city from 
further blight. See id. These bills were later seen as fuel for the Team Four Report. See id. The bills 
recommended that 74,000 buildings in the white, south side of St. Louis be preserved while 70,000 
buildings in north St. Louis, home to a large subsect of the St. Louis African American community, be 
demolished. Id.; see also The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: 
From “Team 4” Into the Future, supra note 1, at 24 (statement of Jamala Rogers, Chairperson, Org. for 
Black Struggle). 











activity.”19 While suburbs were sprouting up around most urban areas, St. 
Louis proved unique in its simultaneous rate of city center abandonment.20 
According to the Rand report, this dramatic desertion resulted from several 
factors typical of city decline compounding in “unusual strength.”21 Like 
other midwestern and east coast cities, St. Louis contained a large inventory 
of old “housing and industrial capital” expensive to maintain and restore.22 
Further, the exorbitant amount of flat farmland outside the city, amenable 
to future development, made it particularly conducive to suburban flight.23 
Even more problematic, though individuals were fleeing from the city into 
the suburbs, the price of urban property remained consistently high.24 With 
exorbitant urban property prices, hope of future reinvestment became futile. 
Similarly, a reduction in urban residents failed to render public goods and 
services more accessible: the city’s wealthier families fled into the county, 
bringing capital and leaving an increased share of public costs with those 
least equipped to handle the economic burden.25 
B. Introducing the Team Four Plan  
Likely in an effort to revitalize the city, as well as the neighborhoods 
most threatened by impending “blight,” including those identified 
throughout the Rand report, the City Plan Commission hired Team Four, 
Inc. as consultants in the drafting of the urban-scape’s new master plan.26 
In its first set of submissions, the planning firm presented a memo entitled 
“City Wide Implementation Strategies for the Draft Comprehensive Plan,” 
 
19. BARBARA R. WILLIAMS, ST. LOUIS: A CITY AND ITS SUBURBS V (1973), https://www.metrost 
l.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-Rand-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQC3-7VSJ]. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at vi. 
22. Id.  
23. See id.; see also id. at 27 (“More land is available in the suburbs than in the city. At present, 
about 1300 acres (not all zoned industrial) are available for development in St. Louis, whereas 4200 
acres already zoned for industrial use are available for development in St. Louis County.”). 
24. Id. at vii. The report stressed that the stagnating price of urban property was, in large part, 
attributable to the “negative effects of surrounding, deteriorating neighborhoods” that made developers 
unwilling to invest in City property. Id. at 27 n.20.  
25. Id. at vii. In the ten years following 1960, the city’s African American population increased 
from 29%–41%, while only rising from 6%–7% in the remaining metro area. Id. at 23. Further, the ratio 
of high-income families decreased dramatically—“[i]n 1959, 11 percent of families in the city had 
incomes at least double the city’s median family income; by 1969 only 4 percent had such incomes.” Id. 
Meanwhile, the share of low-income families rose—“[i]n 1959, 16 percent of families in the city had 
incomes below half the city’s median family income; by 1969, 21 percent had such incomes.” Id.  
26. Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 156. Working independently from the city’s planners, the 
planning firm was tasked with composing twelve technical memos initially intended to function as 
guidelines in the city’s planning process. Id. The team consisted of Washington University in St. Louis 
graduates, a group of individuals drawn to the school’s faculty and fueled by an interest in urban law 












later recognized as the “Team Four Plan.”27 Formally submitted on March 
31, 1975, the memorandum advised the city to apply three drastically 
different treatments to three corresponding regions.28 In explaining the need 
for a dissected and thus targeted urban plan, the report highlighted the 
severely limited financial resources of St. Louis, emphasizing that “Federal 
and State Aid cannot be wasted.”29  As a solution, the Team Four Plan 
recommended that the City “carefully husband its resources and reap the 
greatest impact from its services and capital improvements.”30  
Identified as “Conservation Areas,” the first category presented by the 
team included St. Louis areas marked by their “ability to attract continued 
private reinvestment,” all of which could be improved through “simple 
home repairs to more massive expenditures associated with the renovation 
of industrial properties or new commercial investments.”31 Team Four’s 
strategy posited these areas as the foundation of the city’s rejuvenation such 
that “the City’s primary public responsibility for the future of the entire 
community [was] to buttress and then build upon these critical areas.”32 
While the report failed to explicitly identify the geographic locations of 
these areas, St. Louis community members recognized “Conservation 
Areas” as being “concentrated in South St. Louis which had, in 1974, a 
majority white population.”33  
Stressing the need for continued public investment throughout the City, 
the report emphasized the role “high level” public services might play in 
inducing local investment.34 As such, the report highlighted the need for 
proper public schools, trash collection, and code enforcement, identifying 
zoning as a pillar of the plan’s overall execution.35 Specifically, the team 
advocated for these areas’ continued residential and commercial land use 
trends, noting that the “varied neighborhood housing districts, interspersed 
with service commercial uses, bind the areas together.”36 Recognizing the 
necessity of an aesthetically pleasing environment, the Team Four Plan 
implored the city to implement and “enforce stricter ordinances to control 
 
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 3.  
30. Id.  
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
33. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 
4” Into the Future, supra note 1, at 71 (comment of Terry Kennedy, Alderman, 18th Ward, City of St. 
Louis). 
34. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 3. 
35. Id. at 3–4. 
36. Id. at 4. 











the quality of the existing environment,” finding enforcement to be the 
means by which the city might stem blight.37  
The second zone identified by the city planners encompassed regions 
within the city marked as “redevelopment areas,” wherein the key objective 
would be to “induce on a phased basis concentrated and coordinated private 
investment.”38 Best characterized by their tenuous relationship to blight, 
these areas were identified as “those places that are at a critical point 
between progress and decay; [where] the future holds either the promise of 
reinvestment or the spectre of continued waivering [sic] and inevitable 
deterioration.”39 Like Conservation Areas, these areas were located in South 
St. Louis and included “large tracts of land in the Central Corridor of the 
city which was also majority white.”40 Devoid of the economic strength and 
community-based initiatives that typically guarantee a city’s success, the 
target parcels required the help of government programs committed to 
community rejuvenation.41  The report praised the city’s use of the 353 
Program as a means of supporting urban renewal areas identified as 
“blighted”42 and recommended continued implementation throughout the 
Redevelopment Areas.43  
Pursuant to Chapter 353 Property Tax Abatement, real property tax 
abatement serves as an incentive for the city to encourage revitalization 
within blighted areas.44 In endorsing the city’s implementation of Chapter 
353, the Team Four Plan identified Redevelopment Areas as those most in 
need of greater investment.45 Further, the team stressed the necessity of 
utilizing both public and private resources, recognizing city financial 
 
37. Id. at 5. 
38. Id. at 7. 
39. Id.  
40. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 
4” Into the Future, supra note 1, at 71 (comment of Terry Kennedy, Alderman, 18th Ward, City of St. 
Louis).  
41. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 7. 
42. The 353 program defines a “blighted area” as “that portion of the city within which the 
legislative authority of such city determines that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded 
design or physical deterioration have become economic and social liabilities, and that such conditions 
are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.” MO. REV. 
STAT. § 353.020(1) (1993). 
43. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 8. 
44. § 353.110; see MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CHAPTER 353 TAX 
ABATEMENT (2007), https://ded.mo.gov/sites/default/files/programs/flyers/Chapter353_ProgSummary 
_2016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6TQ-YTJY]. The legislation offers up to twenty-five years of tax 
abatement for urban redevelopment corporations that have taken the title of properties belonging to 
“blighted areas.” § 353.110.2. For the first ten years of ownership, the property is exclusively subject to 
the taxes assessed in the year prior to the corporation’s acquisition. Id. § 353.110.1. In the following 15 
years, the real property acquired by Urban Redevelopment Corporations may be assessed up to “fifty 
percent of the true value of such real property, including any improvements made thereon” Id. § 
353.110.2. 












contributions and developmental oversight to be crucial elements of the 
Redevelopment Areas’ future success.46 In explaining the city’s new role 
within the redevelopment process, the report charged local officials with (1) 
determining which areas have the greatest possibility for future 
improvement, (2) publicizing these areas, (3) outlining potential goals for 
these locales, (4) finding tools to increase the areas’ potential, (5) allocating 
public resources to the outlined initiatives, (6) sketching out the necessary 
allotment of private investment, and (7) enforcing the programs necessary 
for area success.47 
Finally, the report demarcated a zone destined for decimation: 
“Depletion Areas,” defined as “areas of spotty City services and red lining 
– where large numbers of the unemployed, the elderly and the recipients of 
welfare are left to wait for assistance which does not seem to be 
forthcoming.”48 These areas were identified by a surplus of “abandoned 
buildings, vacant lots[,] and economic collapse.”49 According to Alderman 
Terry Kennedy’s comments regarding the Team Four Plan, these “transition 
areas” were “those areas in North St. Louis which, in 1974, were 
predominantly African-American.”50 In addressing these areas, the report 
recognized an unavoidable catch-22. On the one hand, demolishing the 
deteriorating buildings and thereby creating a series of vacant parcels would 
ensure that the neighborhoods devolved into masses of “rubble-filled lots 
and boarded up buildings,” which would discourage future investment.51 
Yet, “to expend public funds on new streets, libraries, schools or code 
enforcement in an area designated for total renewal d[idn’t] make sense 
either.”52 The city should not, the report advised, attempt to serve these 
areas while simultaneously attempting to undergo redevelopment.53 Instead, 
the report suggested that the city implement patience, warning that 
“[a]llowing or encouraging scattered, uncoordinated investments within 
Depletion Areas will only sap the City’s too limited fiscal resources.”54 The 
firm went on to advocate for residential growth control by way of zoning as 
 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 7–8. 
48. Id. at 15.  
49. Id. 
50. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 
4” Into the Future, supra note 1, at 71 (comment of Terry Kennedy, Alderman, 18th Ward, City of St. 
Louis). African American community leaders, upon the report’s release, identified that the threatened 
areas were “generally bounded by Twentieth Street, Delmar Boulevard, Natural Bridge Avenue and the 
western city limits.” Philip Sutin, Plan Said to Hurt Black Area in City, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 
19, 1975 (§ 1-10B), at 19. Pursuant to Nesby Moore Jr., approximately 166,000 people lived in the areas 
marked “depleted” by the Team Four Report. Id.  
51. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 15. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. 
54. Id.  











presented within Golden v. Township of Ramapo. 55  Citing the town of 
Ramapo as a case study, the report emphasized the need to “chart a capital 
improvement program” to ensure that Depletion Areas may eventually 
become ready for redevelopment.56  
Moving on to the issue of taxation within Depletion Areas, the planning 
firm recognized that taxes were largely left unpaid throughout these 
neighborhoods, finding this especially true for properties packed with 
vacant and deteriorating buildings. 57  While the report appreciated St. 
Louis’s Land Reutilization Law 58  as a tool for refurbishing previously 
undesirable property and recognized that land confiscation upon a failure to 
pay taxes motivates property owners to cooperate with the collector of 
revenue, it also acknowledged that the program’s success relied upon the 
acquired land’s ability to sell.59 Given that much of the land coming from 
Depletion Areas proved to be economically undesirable, rendering 
investment implausible as a result of the areas’ dependency upon federal 
assistance, future sales of individual parcels of property seemed unlikely.60 
The report consequently promoted a “wait and see” approach and implored 
the city to utilize a long-term strategy in its invocation of land reutilization 
authority (LRA).61 Under this approach, the city might “assemble a large 
inventory of property available for future significant development,” classify 
them as unsuitable for sale and keep them as public reserves until public 
support for further mass development was made available.62  
Most telling, however, was the report’s campaign against strict code 
enforcement throughout these “abandoned” neighborhoods. The team 
claimed that, as Depletion Areas already suffered from “severe difficulties,” 
to strictly enforce housing codes would only add “further impetus to the 
deterioration and abandonment cycle.” 63  For this recommendation, the 
report found support in City of St Louis v. Brune,64 wherein a Missouri court 
 
55. Id. at 16; see also Golden v. Plan. Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 383 (1972) (finding that 
“where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the community are inadequate to 
furnish the essential services and facilities which a substantial increase in population requires, there is a 
rational basis for ‘phased growth’”).  
56. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 16–17.  
57. See id. at 17. In 1971, four years before the report’s submission, there were approximately 
3200 abandoned buildings throughout the city and “virtually all of these were located in Depletion 
Areas.” Id.  
58. MO. REV. STAT. § 92.875 (Supp. 1971). Under the statute, land reutilization authority is 
intended to “foster the public purpose of returning land which is in a nonrevenue generating nontax 
producing status, to effective utilization in order to provide housing, new industry, and jobs for the 
citizens.” § 92.875.2.  
59. TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 17–18.  
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 18. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 19. 












held that the requirement to meet city-wide code standards may be 
unreasonable in regard to certain properties.65 Reading the Brune decision 
as judicial endorsement of greater flexibility in terms of code enforcement, 
the report contended that strict code enforcement should only be embraced 
when reinvestment is simultaneous.66 
C. Community Reactions  
Prior to its dissemination, a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
Philip Sutin, obtained a copy of the Team Four Plan.67 Upon reading the 
urban planning report, Sutin placed pen to paper, eager to reveal the report 
for what it was: a cast of “doom” for the St. Louis African American 
community.68  In retrospect, Sutin’s exposé emphasized the plan’s most 
alarming recommendation, that of depriving deteriorating regions from 
proper service and instead focusing on the most prosperous 
neighborhoods—a decision that would effectively undermine the city’s 
African American population.69  
For many, the report came as no surprise. Former Alderman C.B. 
Broussard reasoned that the policies suggested within the report were 
already being implemented throughout the city, claiming, “It’s happening 
without a doubt.” 70  Nesby Moore Jr., president of the Union-Sarah 
Economic Development Corporation, explained that lending institutions 
within the city consistently failed to invest in what the Team Four Report 
had identified as “depleted areas” due to the city’s failure to engage in code 
enforcement and endorse neighborhood development.71 Failing “financial 
and social commitment” to these areas, the region was susceptible to a major 
reduction in population and, thus, a reduced tax-base.72  
A second camp of residents, though, encouraged the Plan, noting in 
particular the financial realities of the city. While Deputy Director of the 
Community Development Agency David Hyrsko reasoned that the city did 
not want to ignore areas marked depleted, he understood that priorities, 
 
65. Id. at 678–79; TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 19.  
66. See TEAM FOUR, INC., supra note 4, at 19–20. 
67. Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 160. Mayor of St. Louis, John H. Poelker, opted to keep 
the initial study a secret from the city’s public. Eventually, however, the newspaper was able to receive 
a copy of the paper from the Department of Housing and Urban Development by way of the federal 
Freedom of Information Act. Philip Sutin, supra note 50, at 19.  
68. Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 160. For many members of the African American 
community, the plan was viewed as a mechanism by which the city might “remove blacks, particularly 
poor blacks.” Philip Sutin, Political Changes in Third City Planning Draft, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 22, 1975, at 1. 
69. Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 160. 
70. Id. 
71. Sutin, supra note 50, at 19.  
72. Id.  











upon financial infeasibility, were an irrefutable necessity.73  Confirming 
Hyrsko’s assumptions, Alderman Milton Svetanics, a Democratic 
representative of the 27th Ward, found that the city simply did not have 
money to spend on further development.74 As such, the Alderman reasoned, 
the City needed to “make a choice about which areas [it] want[ed] to save,” 
acknowledging that any remaining areas would have to suffer from “benign 
neglect.”75  
Despite the fact that several political leaders agreed with the underlying 
objective and rationale behind the Team Four Plan, “public outcry, city 
politics, and administration policies” resulted in a revised draft of the city 
plan. 76  The revision responded to the public’s outrage regarding the 
proposed city triage; in their new report, the drafters insisted that the plan 
was “not aimed at the removal” of the African American community.77 Still, 
the newly revised draft maintained the initial report’s assumptions regarding 
the state of St. Louis, merely changing aspects of the report to “blur its 
implications” and refrain from “commit[ing]” the city to following the 
“economics of the private enterprise.”78  
Notwithstanding the consulting firm’s attempt to abate the African 
American residents’ growing anxieties regarding the north side of St. Louis 
and the City’s new plan for future revitalization, an article published four 
months after the report’s leak confirmed the community’s concerns 
regarding the fate of their city.79 Finding the report to be the “new chapter” 
of an “old strategy that had haunted the black community of St. Louis for 
the whole of the twentieth century — the age-old strategy of racial 
containment,” Ernest Calloway, then assistant professor of urban affairs at 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. Agreeing with an urban policy that prioritizes “the greatest good for the greatest number,” 
Alderman Svetanics subscribed to a strategy first introduced by Anthony Downs, scholar of urban policy 
and public administration working in Chicago, namely a strategy of urban triage. Cooper-McCann, supra 
note 6, at 158–59. Pursuant to this tactic, a city may be categorized as “healthy, ill, or terminal” according 
to a “classification system” made up of five factors intended to monitor for neighborhood decay, 
including (1) declining “socioeconomic status,” (2) a change in ethnic demographic, “from white to 
minority occupancy,” (3) decay of housing and infrastructure, (4) community pessimism regarding the 
status of the surrounding area, and (5) “economic disinvestment” throughout the neighborhood. Id. at 
158. Using these values, each neighborhood could be identified as being in one of five stages. In stage 
four and five, houses and neighborhoods were marked as being “deteriorated,” meaning they contained 
“high rates of crime, high rates of poverty, and widespread vacancy and abandonment.” Id. at 159. 
Pursuant to Downs’ theory, once a neighborhood could be categorized within these stages, nothing could 
revive them save except for “total clearance and redevelopment.” Id. Scholar Ernest Calloway was the 
first individual to recognize the Team Four Plan as being reflective of Anthony Downs’ theory. See 
Calloway, supra note 9, at 2D. 
76. Sutin, supra note 68, at 1.  
77. See id.  
78. Id. at 18.  












St. Louis University and member of the St. Louis Community Development 
Commission, drew attention to the historic division of St. Louis, one which, 
through mechanisms such as block-busting, redlining, and federal housing, 
effectively generated “two distinct cities within one single political 
entity.” 80  These policies, arguably preserved by the Team Four Plan, 
constructed the “black urban ghetto of St. Louis,” a city of “poverty,” while 
contributing to the creation of a “city of whites, . . . steeped in indifference, 
racial fear[,] and seeking security in all-white sanctuaries.”81  
Analyzing the Team Four Plan, Calloway’s article recognized the no-
growth policy as functioning similarly to President Nixon’s policy of benign 
neglect, reasoning that the policy was neither original nor surprising.82 In 
fact, the plan merely revealed the “urban strategy” that had been suggested 
throughout the country by political leaders and urban planners alike. 83 
Similarly, the strategy could be seen as nothing more than a continuation of 
racially restrictive real estate practices embraced throughout St. Louis’s 
past.84 Like the “zoning laws, the power of eminent domain, redlining, [and] 
benign neglect,” the planning firm’s no-growth policy in regard to 
“depleted” areas simply contributed to the “continuing drive to restrict the 
living space for blacks and to build safe sanctuaries for whites.”85  
Though the Team Four Plan was never officially adopted by St. Louis,86 
today’s residents maintain that the plan has been implemented 
nonetheless.87 Alderman Brandon Bosley, working in the Third Ward of St. 
Louis, has identified the Team Four Plan as “the plan that caused all the 
detriment that St. Louis has right now,” reasoning that “[w]e talk about 




82. Id. “Benign neglect” was ultimately “based on the perception that black Americans had made 
such substantial educational gains that it was no longer necessary for the federal government politically 
to subsidize civil rights.” Charles Sumner Stone, Jr., Thucydides’ Law of History, or From Kerner, 1968 
to Hacker, 1992, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1711, 1719 (1993).  
83. Calloway, supra note 9, at 2D.  
84. Id. “In this respect, the history of St. Louis is prototypical. Unfortunately, for the whole of 
the twentieth century, the city has been preoccupied with containment and benign neglect as they related 
to black living space. . . [thereby] building its black ghetto.” Id. For others, the plan was problematic not 
because it offered an explicit endorsement of a racial divide but, rather, because it failed to account for 
the “fact that African-Americans occupied the vast majority of the neighborhoods that would seemingly 
be allowed to fail.” Sells, supra note 18. For many, the plan appeared to be a mere reflection of the 
notion that “[r]acism has always been a business proposition.” Id.  
85. Calloway, supra note 9, at 2D. 
86. See Cooper-McCann, supra note 6, at 149.  
87. See Jamala Rogers, Team Four Sucka-Punch, ST. LOUIS AM. (last updated Oct. 5, 2017), http 
://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/jamala_rogers/team-four-sucka-punch/article_4df19988-85d 
e-533c-a9f1-1fe0496259bb.html [https://perma.cc/SQ6P-FZEF]. (“Groups like the Ad Hoc Committee 
and the Coalition Against Team Four were successfully [sic] in beating back the plan, but not the 
concept. The plan has been sanitized and continually updated, but the goals of Team Four prevail.”).  











those things happened around the time the Team Four plan was being talked 
about and implemented to a degree.”88 By the time the Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community Opportunity of the Committee on Financial 
Services came together on March 8, 2008, approximately thirty-five years 
after the Team Four Plan’s release, it was clear that though the report had 
not been formally implemented throughout the region, the city had 
undoubtedly implemented a strategy of triage: “[t]he central corridor down 
through the years has received significant amount of monies for 
development. The north side has not seen that.”89  
In its review of St. Louis development, the Committee focused on 
various projects throughout the north side of St. Louis that had been overtly 
disregarded by city officials. The committee addressed the Pruitt-Igoe site,90 
which had been standing “undeveloped and basically in the middle of the 
City in ruins and . . . [had] become a dumping site.”91 When asked why the 
site had been left undeveloped, and whether the City had a plan regarding 
the vacant land, Barbara Geisman, then executive director for community 
development of the City of St. Louis, eventually admitted that no “real 
concrete plans” had been created, confessing, upon Chairwoman Waters’ 
further inquiry, that there had been “[n]o identification of resources or 
 
88. Sells, supra note 18. 
89. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 
4” Into the Future, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Terry Kennedy, Alderman, 18th Ward, St. Louis 
Board of Alderman). The central corridor of St. Louis holds the “major institutions, businesses, and 
factories throughout the City.” Id. at 11. The corridor runs through the middle of the city, encompassing 
all of the “major universities there; Washington University, St. Louis University; your major hospitals; 
downtown St. Louis; the Central West End.” The corridor “extends all the way out to Clayton,” and 
further “[in]to the county.” Id.  
90. Responding to the nationwide housing shortage following World War II, St. Louis began to 
construct the Pruitt-Igoe towers, a high-rise public housing project located on the north side of St. Louis; 
while Pruitt had been intended for Black residents, Igoe had been built for white residents. RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS 
TROUBLES 11–12 (2014). By the time the towers were completed in 1956, however, white residents were 
no longer interested in the urban public housing as cheap housing became readily available for white 
families alone in both South St. Louis and the surrounding suburban area. See id. As such, both towers 
filled with welfare-dependent, African American families, “frequently headed by single mothers.” Id. 
Soon after occupancy, the public housing project, home to those who “simply couldn’t live anywhere 
else,” succumbed to “property crime, gang activity, drug dealing, prostitution and murder.” Colin 
Marshall, Pruitt-Igoe: the Troubled High-Rise that Came to Define Urban America – a History of Cities 
in 50 Buildings, Day 21, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 7:52 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/201 
5/apr/22/pruitt-igoe-high-rise-urban-america-history-cities [https://perma.cc/NN2B-2H76]. By the 
1960s, approximately four years after initial occupancy, the towers became a “national symbol of 
dysfunctional public housing.” ROTHSTEIN, supra note 90, at 12. 
91. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 












dollars, not even an assessment of the property” in regards to the historic 
site.92  
To understand why development throughout the north side of St. Louis 
never transpired and why, instead, the money has been funneled to the south 
side, Chairwoman Waters turned to Terry Kennedy, alderman of the 
Eighteenth Ward of St. Louis. 93  Alderman Kennedy explained how 
aldermen and the public allocate city funds, including CDBG funding.94 To 
allocate funds, aldermen are required to propose development projects and, 
“to have a project, you need to have a developer.”95 For the north side of St. 
Louis, a largely disenfranchised community, this requirement functions as 
an impossible obstacle—the likelihood of obtaining an interested developer 
appears incredibly slim.  
II. A MODERN TEAM FOUR PLAN 
Recognized as a “true ‘innovator’ when it comes to segregation,” St. 
Louis is frequently credited with deploying modern discriminatory tools 
reminiscent of racial zoning and restrictive covenants, effectively ossifying 
the city’s notorious racial divide.96 Initially adopted as a means of stemming 
blight in neighborhoods marked by “abandoned homes and storefronts,” TIF 
and tax incentives serve as the region’s most creative segregation tools, 
ensuring that public investment reaches St. Louis’s wealthiest 
neighborhoods while neglecting areas most desperate for public 
assistance.97 Ultimately, through Missouri’s TIF Act, the St. Louis region 
successfully promulgates the Team Four Plan, supporting communities 
most capable of evading depletion while neglecting areas most vulnerable 
to impending blight.  
 
92. Id. Likewise, Director Geisman explained that no plans had been made regarding Carter 
Carburetor, a Superfund site located within the middle of the city, as the owner of the site had been 
unwilling to collaborate with city officials and the EPA. Id. at 13–14. To this, Chairwoman Waters 
responded, “Am I left to believe that the City of St. Louis does not have the ability, the authority, the 
wherewithal to confront that kind of resistance?” Id. at 13. Remaining on this point, Waters asked 
whether “someone who has been sitting on such a property in the middle of the City has been able to 
outfox, outsmart, and elude all of the smart people in the city?” Id. at 14.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 15. For more information on CDBG funds, see infra note 97.  
95. The Use of Federal Housing and Economic Development Funds in St. Louis: From “Team 
4” Into the Future, supra note 1, at 15. 
96. Molly Metzger, Dismantling the Divide: It’s Time to Dismantle TIFs as Tool of Segregation, 
ST. LOUIS AM. (last updated July 26, 2018), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/guest_colum 
nists/it-s-time-to-dismantle-tifs-as-tool-of-segregation/article_118f3574-7f42-11e8-9c5b-0fb4db57031 
9.html [https://perma.cc/X4YL-ZFBX].  
97. See id.  











A. The Missouri TIF Act  
In 1982, approximately ten years after the initial release of the Team 
Four Plan, Missouri passed the “Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act,” a statute that aims to incentivize local redevelopment 
with tax increment financing (TIF).98 Seen as a partnership “between local 
governments and private developers,” TIF statutes have served as crucial 
tools for “the revitalization of declining urban areas,” a necessary 
consequence resulting from the “wake of declining federal assistance for 
urban renewal projects.” 99  Under the Missouri TIF statute, “increased 
property tax revenues generated by the redeveloped land” are used to 
finance redevelopment of “blighted areas.”100 The Act offers the following 
definition for “blighted areas”: 
[A]n area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or 
inadequate street layout, insanitary, or unsafe conditions, 
deterioration of site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete 
platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or 
property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, 
retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an 
economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare in its present condition and use.101 
 
98. Goshorn, supra note 8, at 919; see Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment 
Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800–866 (2016).  
99. Goshorn, supra note 8, at 924. The federal government initially served as the purse of urban 
development, creating the 1949 federal Housing Act as a means of providing funds for slum clearance. 
See Kristen Erickson, Protecting Low Income Residents During Tax Increment Financing 
Redevelopment, 36 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 206 (2011). In the 1970s, the Housing Act was replaced 
by the Housing and Community Development Act, which introduced Community Development Block 
Grants (CDBGs) as a means of financing further urban redevelopment. Id. at 207. Into the twenty-first 
century, however, CDBG funding from the federal government has declined. Consequently, “greater 
control and funding responsibility has shifted to local governments” in regard to urban redevelopment 
while “property tax revolts” have resulted in voter limitations on “property tax rates, tax assessments, 
and debt.” Id. As such, “[t]he rise of TIF funding for redevelopment can be explained by the decrease in 
federal funding provided to local governments, the resulting increase in demand for local funds for these 
projects, and a simultaneous refusal to pay higher taxes.” Id. at 207–08. TIF is thus frequently invoked 
as a means for the local governments to increase funding for redevelopment while staving off voter 
discontent, assuring that neither debt nor tax is raised. See id.  
100. Goshorn, supra note 8, at 919 (internal quotation marks omitted).  












For a redevelopment plan to be approved, it must target an area identified 
as a “blighted,” “conservation,”102 or “economic development”103 region 
that “has not been subject to growth and development through investment 
by private enterprise and would not reasonably be anticipated to be 
developed without the adoption of tax increment financing.” 104  To 
demonstrate that development would not occur within the given region “but-
for” receipt of the tax increment financing or, rather, that the region “would 
not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without” the financing, 
applicants must provide a “detailed description of the factors that qualify 
the redevelopment area or project.”105 The redevelopment plan must include 
the following information: (1) estimated project costs; (2) anticipated 
sources of funding for the project; (2) evidence of finance commitment; (4) 
a description of the types and terms of such funding; (5) a description of the 
types and terms of obligations that may be acquired; (6) a recent valuation 
of the property to be redeveloped; (7) an estimate of the assessed valuation 
upon project completion; and (8) the anticipated use of the area. 106 
Additionally, the application process includes a “cost-benefit analysis 
showing the economic impact of the plan on each taxing district which is at 
least partially within the boundaries of the redevelopment area.”107  
The implementation of a TIF ordinance first requires the creation of a 
TIF commission.108  The make-up of the commission depends upon (1) 
whether the project is being adopted by St. Louis City or County and (2) the 
 
102. The Act states that a “Conservation area” is an area that is “not yet a blighted area but is 
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and may become a blighted area.” § 99.805(3). 
Whether or not an area may or may not be designated as blighted depends upon several factors, including 
“dilapidation; obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of structures 
below minimum code standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and 
community facilities; lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land 
coverage; deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of community 
planning.” Id.  
103. Economic development areas are any areas that are neither blighted nor conservation areas, 
but whose development will not unfairly compete with the local economy and is ultimately in the 
public’s best interest as it will (1) discourage certain industries from moving away, (2) increase local 
employment, or (3) maintain or improve the local tax base. See § 99.805(5).  
104. § 99.810.1(1). 
105. Id. To meet the “but-for” requirement “a determination must be submitted via an affidavit by 
the proposed developer along with the redevelopment plan. . . . Under this test, the developer must 
simply show that it would not undertake the development without the TIF, rather than show that the 
development would not be undertaken by anyone without the TIF.” Joe Wilson, Given a Hammer: Tax 
Increment Financing Abuse in the St. Louis Region, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 83, 91 (2014); see 
also Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for Blight and But-For to 
Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1034 (2001) (explaining the but-for test of the Missouri TIF Act).  
106. See GILMORE & BELL, P.C., SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS 6 (2018), https: 
//www.gilmorebell.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Economic-Development-Memo-2018.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/T78J-66LH].  
107. § 99.810.1(5). 
108. See Wilson, supra note 105, at 84.  











desired location of the redevelopment project.109 Depending on the location 
and sponsor of the redevelopment project, the commission is to be 
comprised of varying numbers of members appointed by the city, the school 
districts, the county, and other taxing districts.110 Once the commission has 
assessed the TIF redevelopment plan, the group hosts a public hearing 
regarding the project, inviting any “interested person or affected taxing 
district” to file objections or comments regarding the redevelopment 
scheme.111  Under the Act, the “commission shall hear and consider all 
protests, objections, comments[,] and other evidence presented at the 
hearing.”112 Following these hearings, the commission will make certain 
recommendations to the “governing body of the municipality” in which the 
TIF project will be implemented relating to “the adoption of redevelopment 
plans or redevelopment projects and the designation of redevelopment 
areas.”113 Between two weeks and ninety days following the completion of 
the commission’s hearings, a Missouri municipality may approve a 
redevelopment plan and project, designating the project in accordance with 
the requirements laid out throughout the TIF Act and entering into any 
contracts necessary pursuant to the redevelopment project or plan.114  
TIF statutes are adopted with the assumption that once a redevelopment 
project is executed, the value of all property within the targeted 
redevelopment area will rise.115 In execution, when a plan is adopted, “the 
assessed value of real property in the redevelopment area is frozen for tax 
purposes at the current base level prior to construction of improvements.”116 
The property owner proceeds to pay property tax at the initial “base 
level.”117 Once the property is improved, the value of the property in the 
targeted redevelopment area rises above the original base level and a tax 
increment is established.118 These increments, identified as “payments in 
lieu of taxes” (PILOTS) are paid by the owner as regular property taxes 
normally would be. 119  These PILOTS are then transferred to the 
 
109. See GILMORE & BELL, P.C., supra note 106, at 4. 
110. See id.; Wilson, supra note 105, at 86. 
111. § 99.825.1; see Wilson, supra note 105, at 87; GILMORE & BELL, P.C., supra note 106, at 19. 
112. Id.  
113. See GILMORE & BELL, P.C., supra note 106, at 4. “If . . . the commission makes a 
recommendation . . . in opposition to a proposed redevelopment plan . . . a municipality desiring to 
approve such project . . . shall do so only upon a two-thirds majority vote of the governing body of such 
municipality.” § 99.825.2.  
114. § 99.820.1(1)–(2). 
115. See GILMORE & BELL, P.C., supra note 106, at 3. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. 
118. Id. 












municipality’s treasurer and placed in a “special allocation fund.”120 The 
money in this fund can be subsequently used to “pay redevelopment project 
costs or to retire bonds or other obligations issued to pay such costs.”121 As 
such, “future tax increases are not abated, but rather are used to fund costs 
of the project,”122 thereby attracting private developers and incentivizing the 
revitalization of decaying urban communities. 
B. Implementation of TIF Throughout St. Louis 
Though initially adopted to combat blight throughout Missouri, the 
economic development tool has readily been adopted as a means of 
“pursu[ing] sales tax revenue.” 123  “When it’s done wrong,” Missouri 
Governor Jay Nixon has reasoned, “a TIF diverts revenue from schools, 
infrastructure and public safety, shuffling jobs from one area to another, 
lining the pockets of billionaire developers.” 124  Ultimately, TIFs “draw 
municipalities into a race to the bottom competing to see who can give the 
most generous giveaways [to developers] at the expense of more pressing 
priorities.”125  Seeking the positive economic impact typically associated 
with local development, municipalities and their political heads are driven 
to utilize TIF to collect greater sales and property tax, reaping the profits of 
both commercial and residential expansion. 126  While municipalities 
 
120. Id. In addition, “local taxing districts transfer 50% of all incremental sales and utility tax 
revenues to the treasurer of the municipality for deposit into the special allocation fund.” Id. 
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Wilson, supra note 105, at 93.  
124. Gov. Nixon Signs TIF Reform Bill that Was Spurred by EWG Study, E.-W. GATEWAY 
COUNCIL OF GOV’TS (June 29, 2016), https://www.ewgateway.org/nixon-tif-reform-bill/ [https://perma. 
cc/77HG-Y85Y]. In response to a 2011 report conducted by the East-West Gateway Council of 
Governments entitled An Assessment of the Effectiveness and Fiscal Impacts of the Use of Development 
Incentives in the St. Louis Region, which concluded that the implementation of TIFs was a poor 
economic development strategy for the midwest city, Governor Nixon signed House Bill 1434 into law. 
Id.; see also E.-W. GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND 
FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION: FINAL REPORT 
(2011), https://www.ewgateway.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TIFFinalRpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/77 
HG-Y85Y]. The bill, concerned with municipalities’ ability to override TIF commissions by a two-thirds 
vote of its governing body, limited TIF projects rejected by the commission yet voted into acceptance 
by the municipality, restricting funds to demolition and land clearance alone. Gov. Nixon Signs TIF 
Reform Bill that Was Spurred by EWG Study, supra. This legislation functions as a reaction to the liberal 
interpretation of the term “blight” within the TIF Act compounded with municipal desperation for 
commercial development. While the TIF commission designates the plan as worthy or unnecessary for 
the specified region, municipal governing bodies are inclined to reject these recommendations in favor 
of local development.  
125. Id. (quoting Governor Nixon). 
126. See Wilson, supra note 105, at 93 (discussing the prisoner’s dilemma inherent to Tax 
Increment Financing while reasoning that “[m]unicipal leaders [when dealing with TIF] are faced with 
the unattractive choice of placing a tax initiative on the ballot or reducing services if they choose not to 
participate in the pursuit of this additional revenue”).  











scramble for development under TIF, developers are given the upper-hand, 
equipped with the “ability to leverage regional insecurities against 
municipalities.”127 
The fight for local development is further exacerbated by St. Louis’s 
dependence upon sales tax revenue; over forty communities throughout the 
region “get at least half of the taxes they collect from sales tax revenue. 
Some get upwards of 70% and even 80% of their total taxes from sales tax 
alone.”128 A loss of “high sales tax receipts” from big-box stores threatens 
the community’s overall health.129 Unable to fund necessary, tax-dependent 
municipal services such as local schools, fire departments, and sanitation 
crews, municipalities deprived of adequate sales tax revenue risk the 
community’s safety, comfort, and general health. As municipalities are 
tasked with managing reduced federal funding for urban redevelopment 
while also struggling to sustain reasonable property tax rates, political 
leaders are incentivized to “replace low-income residential communities 
with high-income residential and commercial redevelopment” to increase 
both property and sales tax revenue as a means of maintaining proper public 
services.130  
The overall effects of TIF as implemented throughout the City of St. 
Louis have proven detrimental to low-income communities. A 2011 
assessment of the fiscal effects of St. Louis development incentives revealed 
that while TIF and other tax incentives appear beneficial for the “incentive-
using municipality,” in practice, TIF funding negatively affects surrounding 
communities.131 While an increase in jobs could be seen throughout the TIF-
using regions, jobs decreased in surrounding communities as several 
municipalities suffered from decreased sales and property tax revenues.132 
Further, the use of TIF throughout the region greatly aggravates racial 
disparities throughout the metropolitan area because private developers are 
often incentivized to bring their projects to “higher-income 
communities,”133 thereby introducing an “unneeded, extra advantage” that 
“further handicap[s]” areas of high poverty.134 
 
127. Id.  
128. Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).  
129. Id.  
130. Erickson, supra note 99, at 213 (footnote omitted). 
131. E.-W. GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, supra note 124, at 35.  
132. See id.  
133. Id. at 36. In a 2003 report, analysts “found that less than half of the 21 St. Louis area TIF-
using municipalities were disadvantaged based on four measurements of distress and by another 
measure, only 7 of the TIF-areas were ‘at-risk.’” Id. app. G at 68 (quoting THOMAS LUCE, RECLAIMING 
THE INTENT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCE IN THE KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREAS 
(2003)). 












An analysis of more recent St. Louis-based TIF projects reveals the 
region’s continued use of Tax Increment Financing as a means of 
developing high-income residential and commercial redevelopment rather 
than assisting communities marred by “inadequate street layout” and 
“insanitary or unsafe conditions.”135 Effectively serving as a continuation of 
the Team Four Plan, this misapplication of TIF reflects a policy of urban 
triage; today, the economic development tool is most often used to improve 
areas identifiable as “conservation” or “redevelopment” areas, while areas 
desperate for public assistance, what Team Four would identify as 
“depletion areas,” are ignored, resulting in large vacant or deteriorating 
tracts throughout the region. This inequity is primarily achieved as a result 
of two practical effects of the TIF statute, both of which are discussed 
below. 
The statute’s manipulatable “blight” and “but-for” 136  requirements 
facilitate such disparity. First, the “but-for” provision of the statute merely 
requires developer testimony stating that “but-for” the TIF, that specific 
developer would not invest in the local project.137 It holds no provision 
stating that “but-for” the development tool, no developer would engage with 
the region. As for the “blight” requirement, several commercial 
redevelopment plans have been introduced to “affluent suburban areas” as 
a means of developing malls and big-box stores.138 Though intended “to 
draw development to low-income neighborhoods and increase economic 
opportunity for their residents”139  and thereby alleviate blight, TIFs are 
frequently misapplied, providing “developers and lawyers who subsidize 
political campaigns” ample opportunity to engage in suburban and thus 
profitable redevelopment.140  
A perusal of development incentives used throughout St. Louis suggests 
a clear abuse of the Act’s designation requirement. Between 2000 and 2014, 
84% of approved TIFs were spent in the affluent central corridor and 
downtown St. Louis, “places that are home to relatively little of the city’s 
African American population and where assessed property value per square 
foot is much higher than areas that don’t get incentives.”141 Further, TIF 
 
135. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (2016). 
136. See supra note 105.  
137. Wilson, supra note 105, at 91. 
138. Erickson, supra note 99, at 216.  
139. N. CAMBRIA, P. FEHLER, J.Q. PURNELL & B. SCHMIDT, SEGREGATION IN ST. LOUIS: 
DISMANTLING THE DIVIDE 45 (2018), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/sites.wustl.edu/dist/3/1454/files 
/2018/06/Segregation-in-St.-Louis-Dismantling-the-Divide-22ih4vw.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T6V-R4E 
7]. 
140. Sarah Fenske, St. Louis Is Fighting TIF Reform in Jefferson City. That’s BS, RIVERFRONT 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018, 7:38 AM), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2018/03/21/st-louis-is-fig 
hting-tif-reform-in-jefferson-city-that-should-make-us-mad [https://perma.cc/YKD2-ZVU3].  
141. CAMBRIA ET AL., supra note 139, at 46.  











investment accounts for over $338 million infused into white or commercial 
areas that did not need the incentive to instigate investment into the 
region.142 In 2012, $10 million in TIFs were granted for the construction of 
a “high-end condominium complex” that included a new Whole Foods, a 
costly grocery chain, as well as a Mercedes-Benz dealership in St. Louis 
City’s wealthy Central West End.143  The Central West End, far from a 
“blighted” neighborhood, maintained a population of 15,518 residents in 
2010, and a four-year college education rate of 63%. 144  Touted as a 
neighborhood that, in 2011, had “it all,” including “[s]ome of the biggest 
and most beautiful mansions in the entire city,” “old growth trees providing 
shade, color and life to its streets,” as well as “little pocket gardens and 
plantings,” the Central West End, upon receiving TIF funding, was far from 
the “blighted area” envisioned by the Real Property Tax Increment 
Allocation Redevelopment Act.145 Free from “defective or inadequate street 
layout, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration . . . [and] conditions 
which endanger[ed] life or property,” 146  the neighborhood appeared 
committed to the safety of its residents, with crime in 2012 having decreased 
66% from the area’s total number of crimes in 2003.147 Meanwhile, two 
years following the erection of Whole Foods, a grocery store on North 
Grand Boulevard in Fairground Park was shut down, and remained vacant 
as of 2018.148 With an average home sales price of approximately $8,000 in 
 
142. Id. Meanwhile, in 2017 alone, the comptroller’s office found that approximately $30 million 
in “forgone revenue because of abatements.” Jacob Barker, Tax Breaks Cost St. Louis, School District 
Almost $30 Million in 2017, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/%20 
business/local/tax-breaks-cost-st-louis-school-district-almost-million-in/%20article_2682ca1a-a7bb-58 
3a-85be-61525bf365d1.html [https://perma.cc/C5TS-RLEN]. This money “would have been shared 
among St. Louis Public Schools, the Zoo-Museum District, St. Louis Public Library, the city and other 
taxing jurisdictions.” Id.  
143. CAMBRIA ET AL., supra note 139, at 46; see also Tim Bryant, St. Louis Panel Approves TIFs 
for Apartments and Mercedes Dealership, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.stlto 
day.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-panel-approves-tifs-for-apartments-and-mercedes-dealership/article 
_1a0c57f8-93d2-56c8-bb6c-1f65f52f948b.html [https://perma.cc/TNS6-Z3WH].  
144. TODD SWANSTROM, HANK WEBBER & MOLLY METZGER, REBOUND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL CITIES: THE CASE OF ST. LOUIS 48 (2015), https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files 
/pdfs/community%20development/econ%20mobility/sessions/swanstrompaper508.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/6G7C-S8B5]. 
145. Mark Groth, The Central West End Neighborhood, ST. LOUIS CITY TALK (Oct. 24, 2011), ht 
tp://www.stlouiscitytalk.com/posts/2011/10/central-west-end-neighborhood [https://perma.cc/7P8S-B 
DBM]. 
146. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (2016).  
147. Wash. Univ. Med. Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. (wumcrc.com), 2012 Crime Statistics; Making 
2013 Even Better, FOREST PARK SE. NEIGHBORHOOD ASS’N, (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.forestparksou 
theast.com/2012-crime-statistics-making-2013-even-better/ [https://perma.cc/89YJ-QL8T]. 












2010 compared to the Central West End’s $447,000,149 Fairground Park, a 
predominantly African American neighborhood, continued to suffer from 
“buildings . . . crumbling, collapsing and rarely boarded up[,] . . . trash lining 
the streets and roads[,] . . . [and] rampant dumping.”150 Deprived of city 
services, Fairground Park was a clear candidate under the TIF Act, 
presenting unsafe and unsanitary conditions.  
Overlooking apparent need, St. Louis utilizes TIF as a means of 
maintaining local wealth, thereby protecting seemingly prosperous 
neighborhoods while ignoring truly “blighted” areas. In 2016, officials of 
Clayton, in St. Louis County, approved $75.6 million in real estate tax 
abatement to ensure that a Fortune 500 company could expand its campus, 
depriving surrounding communities of the benefits associated with TIF 
funds.151 With a median household income of $91,531 in 2017, and median 
property value of $590,800, Clayton, like the Central West End, proved an 
altogether inappropriate candidate for TIF funding intended to stem 
looming “blight.”152 
While the “but-for” and “blight” requirements are greatly misapplied 
throughout the region, enabling expansion in areas equipped to induce 
investment independently, the TIF Act likewise ensures the continued 
neglect of low-income communities in its failure to account for displaced 
individuals following concerted urban redevelopment. Though urban 
neighborhoods are frequently “demolished under the guise of slum 
clearance” as a result of approved TIF projects, few of the removed 
residential units are replaced with low-cost residential development. 153 
Instead, seeking high profits from increased sales and property tax revenue, 
the municipality replaces affordable housing with high-income residential 
or commercial properties, making the area hostile to low-income 
residents.154 Such was the fate of the many residents of Meacham Park. 
Annexed by the City of Kirkwood in 1991, Meacham Park, a predominantly 
African American, low-income neighborhood made up of small homes, 
initially believed the union would benefit its citizens—the community could 
retain its character while benefiting from Kirkwood’s extensive public 
 
149. See Fairground, ST.LOUIS-MO.GOV, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/live-work/community/nei 
ghborhoods/fairground/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/YCX5-UMRQ]; Central West End, ST.LOUIS-
MO.GOV, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/live-work/community/neighborhoods/central-west-end/index.cf 
m [https://perma.cc/D9ZT-YUHG].  
150. Mark Groth, The Fairground Park Neighborhood, ST. LOUIS CITY TALK (Jan. 29, 2011), http 
://www.stlouiscitytalk.com/posts/2011/01/fairground-park-neighborhood [https://perma.cc/D8Z3-D8N 
G].  
151. Cambria, supra note 139, at 46. 
152. Clayton, MO, DATAUSA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/clayton-mo/ [https://perma.cc/WK8 
W-JKN4].  
153. Erickson, supra note 99, at 214.  
154. Id. at 214.  











services. 155  Four years later, however, Kirkwood initiated a plan that 
dedicated most of the community’s land to a shopping center consisting of, 
in part, Target, Lowe’s, and Walmart stores.156 Facilitated by Kirkwood’s 
approval of a $17 million TIF, development throughout the region displaced 
a large portion of Meacham Park residents as “[m]ost of the homeowners in 
the new commercial footprint were bought out, and a few houses were taken 
through eminent domain.”157  
A similar process occurred in Brentwood, where the former Evens-
Howard Place neighborhood, a “thriving middle-class African American 
neighborhood,” was displaced by home buyouts and TIF financing in an 
effort to erect prime retail area close to the region’s local shopping mall.158 
This resulted in the evacuation of 130 homes and 30 businesses, 
“displac[ing]” approximately 800 residents. 159  The project effectively 
pushed African American individuals into “depletion zones” located in 
North St. Louis County,160 making way for a Target and several other big-
box stores.161 
The region’s prevailing misapplication of TIF funding is particularly 
alarming given the increasing quantity of truly “blighted” areas throughout 
the city, as well as their disproportionate impact on African American 
communities and low-income individuals. Today, the region remains 
burdened by an “unusually high number of vacant properties, primarily in 
North City and in the southeastern portions of the City.”162 Approximately 
90% of the city’s vacant properties are located in majority-black 
neighborhoods.163 Three of these neighborhoods, each approximately 97% 
African American, account for 25% of the city’s vacant buildings.164 These 
properties and neighborhoods remain overlooked by potential commercial 
and residential developers, who, taking advantage of the hyper-competitive 
nature of TIF funding, are able to negotiate development in largely affluent 
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158. CAMBRIA ET AL., supra note 139, at 45–46.  
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160. See supra note 50. 
161. CAMBRIA ET AL., supra note 137, at 46.  
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areas, thereby benefitting from areas already equipped with the proper 
services necessary for successful businesses. Left undeveloped, the vacant 
properties of St. Louis pose serious physical, economic, and emotional 
obstacles for local residents.165  Lowering the overall property values of 
neighboring homes while also acting as a “drain on limited taxpayer 
dollars,” vacant tracts throughout the region deter future investment and 
ensure the stagnation of surrounding neighborhoods.166  As TIF funding 
provides little incentive to invest in truly deteriorating neighborhoods, 
largely vacant communities are left behind, forced to bear the burden of the 
health and economic concerns that frequently accompany abandoned 
buildings.167  
C. Rejecting Reform  
Though several attempts have been made to re-center the underlying 
objective of Missouri’s TIF act, namely the redevelopment of blighted 
areas, Missouri courts have remained resolute in their holding that the blight 
and “but-for” tests of the statute are “valid restraints upon the municipal 
exercise of power.”168 Reasoning that determinations of blight lay with the 
legislature rather than the judiciary, Missouri courts continue to uphold the 
constitutionality of projects stemming from the TIF statute so long as the 
municipality’s determination of blight is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable 
so as to “amount to an abuse of the legislative process.”169 
Further, while advocates of TIF reform have fought to increase 
“transparency on the tax breaks given to developers” and to empower “local 
school districts to have a say in the TIF process,” little progress has been 
made in regard to public control of TIF.170 House Bill 1236, introduced 
before the Missouri House of Representatives in 2018, sought to “curb tax 
incentive subsidies” by removing control from private developers and well-
equipped attorneys and restoring it with those most affected by lost tax 
revenue—public schools.171  Aiming to ensure public participation when 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id.  
167. For more information regarding the health and economic concerns regarding largely vacant 
neighborhoods, see INTERDISCIPLINARY ENV’T CLINIC AT WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF L., supra note 162.  
168. Reinert, supra note 105, at 1039; see Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kan. 
City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo. 1987) (reasoning that “[w]hether a particular area is blighted . . . is a 
matter for the legislative body to resolve. Its authority controls unless its decision is shown to be so 
arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of the legislative process.”) (footnote omitted); 
Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991) (finding that “[i]n making its determination that an area is blighted, and in approving the 
redevelopment plan, the Board of Aldermen acted in its legislative capacity”). 
169. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150.  
170. Fenske, supra note 140.  
171. See id.  











considering public investment for private development, the H.B. 1236 
proposed a thirty-day period wherein a public forum enabled citizens to 
“comment on the proposed district.”172 This forum, pursuant to the bill, 
could be “digital, physical, or both” and would be accompanied by posted 
information regarding the proposal and the mandatory public hearing on the 
municipality’s official website.173 Further, the bill set forth a provision that 
allowed the board of a school district to “elect to have the portion of 
property tax revenue allocated to the school district by a county or 
municipality excluded from a tax increment allocation financing project or 
plan by passing a resolution by two-thirds majority . . . .”174 When the 
legislation began to move in the Missouri House, however, the city 
immediately sent its lobbyists to oppose the bill, reasoning that tax breaks 
should be a matter of “local control.”175 
The Missouri TIF statute functions as a tool of urban triage more so than 
a means of alleviating urban blight. Conforming to policies issued in the 
1974 Team Four Plan, Missouri continues to deploy TIF funding to procure 
and sustain development in areas best characterized by their potential for 
further growth and future profit. 176  Developers are often deterred from 
investing in deteriorating areas plagued by high poverty or a high 
unemployment rate, finding them unlikely to offer true opportunity for 
“profitable private development.”177  In practice, it appears unlikely that 
truly blighted areas could ever benefit from TIF projects. On the contrary, 
TIF funding is largely based on the assumption that “new commercial 
development will bring a certain amount of revenue—in the form of rising 
property values on adjacent parcels, increased revenue from sales taxes, and 
so forth.”178 In theory, the revenue will then be used as a means of “retir[ing] 
the bonds that funded the TIF.”179 Like any municipal bond, however, TIFs 
are dependent upon the issuer’s ability to raise revenue.180 And, “[i]f the 
 
172. H.R. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).  
173. Id.  
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fifteen years. Id. 
175. Fenske, supra note 140; see also Metzger, supra note 96.  
176. See supra Section I.B (discussing Team Four’s description of “redevelopment” areas).  
177. George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses and Abuses 
of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 444 (2011). For many, development is “contingent on 
site specific features—proximity to transportation, shoreline or other natural features, or particular kinds 
of consumers—that are only available in non-blighted areas.” Id. at 444–45. With this in mind, restricting 
TIFs to sincerely blighted areas would merely result in a “small increase in development in blighted area 
at the cost of many foregone projects in non-blighted areas.” Id. at 445. 
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.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/fergusons-fortune-500-company/390492/ [https://perma.cc/S 
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revenue falls short of projections,” the debt must be collected from local 
residents.181  
This is exactly what happened in Ferguson, wherein sales tax accounts 
for the largest portion of the city’s revenue. 182  In 1997, the city’s TIF 
commission unanimously approved TIF funding for The Crossings at Halls 
Ferry.183 Originally valued at $8 million, the Halls Ferry TIF project failed 
to generate enough revenue to cover the city’s bond.184 As a result, in 2012, 
the “TIF-specific deficits” had to be covered by taxpayer money in the form 
of sales tax, municipal court fees, and property tax.185  Rendering local 
communities, particularly low-income individuals, vulnerable to the risks of 
large-scale development, TIFs introduced to severely blighted areas, namely 
those unlikely to attract necessary traffic for greater sales revenue, endanger 
further financial burdens within the community, threatening those least 
equipped to handle the economic stress.186  
III. IMPLEMENTING A SOCIAL IMPACT BOND IN ST. LOUIS CITY TO 
ERADICATE BLIGHT  
Today, the Missourian Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act, in failing to require stringent blight designations while 
readily accepting a feeble “but-for” test, merely incentivizes development 
of St. Louis’s presently affluent regions and thus proves unsuccessful in 
equitably addressing the city’s prevailing blight. Dependent upon sales tax 
revenue, St. Louis municipalities deploy TIF to procure big-box stores at 
the expense of low-income and largely African American neighborhoods 
throughout the city. Recent legislation and prevailing judicial interpretation 
illustrate the state’s overall resistance to amending the provision to re-center 
the legislation’s purpose and thus consecrate Missouri’s commitment to 
urban redevelopment. This section presents an alternative means of tackling 
the pervasive issue of blight and vacancy throughout the City of St. Louis—
Social Impact Bonds. Typically invoked to address social issues ranging 
from rising poverty levels to inadequate healthcare, Social Impact Bonds 
 
181. Id.  
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183. Betsy Riley, Ferguson TIF Commission Passes $25 Million Project, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (Mar. 
9, 1997, 11:00 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/1997/03/10/focus13.html [https://perm 
a.cc/GN9H-PN6K].  
184. See Johnson, supra note 178.  
185. Id.  
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rely on public-private partnerships as a means of effectuating true social 
change.187  
The following sections present Social Impact Bonds as a potential 
mechanism by which the St. Louis region can properly stem blight as 
initially intended under the Missouri TIF statute. Serving to promote the 
public good, Social Impact Bonds relieve disadvantaged communities from 
the stress placed upon municipalities focused on sales tax revenue and thus 
unwilling to commit to the revitalization of severely blighted areas. In 
presenting Social Impact Bonds as potential mechanisms of stemming 
blight and revitalizing deteriorating neighborhoods, this Note, unlike the 
policies of the Team Four Plan and its modern successors, stresses the 
crucial role private investment plays in the initial rejuvenation of neglected 
urban areas. While Team Four and the Missouri TIF statute identify public 
investment as the catalyst of private investment, this Note recognizes the 
inherent constraints placed upon municipal governments funded by tax 
revenue and regulated by voter preference. Assessing the capacities of the 
private investor, this Note contends that genuine equity depends upon a 
strong private-public alliance, ultimately acknowledging the strategy of 
urban triage, as embraced by Team Four and modern St. Louis, to be a 
necessary evil when a financially-fragile government is forced to act 
alone.188  
A. The Social Impact Bond 
First launched in the United States in 2012, a Social Impact Bond (SIB) 
“relies on initial financing from private investors to produce outcomes 
governments value.” 189  Presented as an innovative means of financing 
progressive social services, SIBs “overcome [the] structural limitations of 
investing” in preventative services while protecting local governments from 
voter dissatisfaction by “transfer[ring] risk away from taxpayers and onto 
investors.”190 As is the case in the City of St. Louis, governments are often 
 
187. See Etienne C. Toussaint, The New Gospel of Wealth: On Social Impact Bonds and the 
Privatization of Public Good, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 163–64 (2018).  
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financially incapable of investing in and effectively testing out promising 
social services. Instead, they deploy available development tools 
strategically, spending resources and incentives in reliable and thus “safe” 
situations, as demonstrated by the continued development of St. Louis’s 
Central West End.191 Social Impact bonds serve as a version of “Pay-for-
Success” financing wherein public and private entities work together to 
support public initiatives.192 In a SIB, private investors finance the cost of 
implementing innovative yet risky social programs with the intention of 
saving public funding long term. If the proposed “radical” program proves 
successful, the local government, having ideally saved money as a result of 
the program’s implementation, repays the private entity’s original 
investment with an additional return.193  
B. Social Impact Bond in New York City  
Launched by Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2011, the Rikers Island SIB 
was the United States’ first attempt at deploying Social Impact Bonds to 
expand upon promising social services.194 At the time of its implementation, 
“nearly half of all adolescents incarcerated in Rikers Island jail” were likely 
to “return within one year of being discharged.”195  Concerned with the 
alarming rate of recidivism throughout the state, Mayor Bloomberg tasked 
agencies and innovators alike with the challenge of designing innovative 
programs intended to enhance the lives of “black and Latino men, who 
experience much higher rates of poverty, unemployment and homicide than 
 
possible during a period of constrained government funding, because it lessens the risk that taxpayers 
will pay for ineffective programs.” RUDD ET AL., supra note 186, at ES-2. Traditionally, prevention 
social programs offer “no accountability for success or failure,” often leaving “government entities in a 
bind where if they invest their limited funding in preventative programs that turn out to be ineffective, 
they end up paying for both the ineffective program and the services the program was intended to 
prevent.” Id. at ES-1.  
191. See supra note 143. As discussed above, this trend is readily identifiable throughout the St. 
Louis region. Given the option of investing in a truly “blighted” area in desperate need of greater public 
assistance or a neighborhood straddling the line between success and stagnation, TIF funding will likely 
go to the latter. Further, rather than invest in and thus risk resources for proper low-income housing 
unlikely to produce an increase in sales or property tax revenue, municipalities will strive to invest in 
commercial and high-income residential developments, leaving underprivilege communities largely 
deprived of adequate services and necessary support. See supra Section II.B. 
192. RUDD ET AL., supra 189, at 5. Traditionally, a SIB is identified as an “arrangement between 
one or more government agencies and an external organization where the government specifies an 
outcome (or outcomes) and promises to pay the external organization a pre-agreed sum (or sums) if it is 
able to accomplish the outcome(s).” JITINDER KOHLI, DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV & KRISTINA COSTA, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 101: DEFINING AN INNOVATIVE NEW FINANCING TOOL FOR 
SOCIAL PROGRAMS 2 (2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/03/pd 
f/sib101.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PQ8-6A8Z].  
193. See RUDD ET AL., supra note 189, at ix.  
194. See id. at 1, 4. 
195. Id. at ix.  











their white and Asian peers.”196 Soon after, city figures learned about the 
United Kingdom’s recent implementation of a “cutting-edge financing 
strategy,” the Social Impact Bond.197 Intrigued by the financing model, the 
Mayor’s office created the Young Men’s Initiative (YMI), 198 partnering 
with Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Department of Corrections, and the 
Urban Investment Group of Goldman Sachs Bank USA to initiate the first 
American SIB supported by a well-known financial institution.199 The SIB 
necessitated the collaboration of several public and private actors. Goldman 
Sachs served as the commercial lender, functioning as the private investor, 
and made a $9.6 million loan to the program’s intermediary, the Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), 200  for a program that 
provided behavioral therapy to inmates of Rikers Island jail.201 Meanwhile, 
the philanthropic investor, Bloomberg Philanthropies, provided the $7.2 
million that would be used to repay Goldman Sachs in case of program 
failure.202 The Mayor’s office then functioned as a coordinating body, with 
the Department of Corrections (DOC) agreeing to pay MDRC upon 
program success.203 Additionally, the Osborne Association and Friends of 
Island Academy worked to administer the behavioral therapy, using the 
funds provided by the commercial investor.204 Under the SIB, were the 
behavior therapy successful, meeting its preestablished benchmarks,205 the 
reduction in incarceration would save New York City money and the DOC 
would then be able to pay back the investment. If it failed, the city would 
achieve no savings and would thus be liable for none of the private entities’ 
investments.  
While the true novelty of SIBs presents a “risk of uncertainty to both 
government officials and private investors,” the innovative financing tool is 
gaining traction for its “use in preventive programs in which governments 
 
196. See id at ES-1. 
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have failed to invest.”206 Recognizing the infeasibility of comprehensive 
government intervention into all prominent social issues such as healthcare 
and recidivism, advocates of SIBs recognize private investment, motivated 
by the promise of public return, as an encouraging strategy for “meaningful 
long-term social impact” in the realm of healthcare, the criminal justice 
system, and homelessness.207  
C. Social Impact Bonds in the Context of “Blight”  
While SIBs are typically used to invest in people rather than places, 
promoters of the innovative financing tool contend that SIBs serve as an 
effective “model for funding reclamation of blighted areas that cities inherit 
or want to develop.”208 To further this objective, cities might use private 
capital, rather than public incentives, as a means of facilitating revitalization 
efforts, providing investors a share of the profits if development proves 
effective.209  For some, this model holds the potential to be even more 
advantageous than people-focused prevention programs such as the Rikers 
SIB wherein savings accrued as a result of reduced incarceration rates are 
“unlikely to flow back into the government’s coffers.”210 SIBs devoted to 
blighted areas would likely result in government savings in the form of 
reduced maintenance costs and increased revenue from the property tax 
derived from useful, rather than vacant or deteriorating properties.211 
 
206. Shifali Baliga, Note, Shaping the Success of Social Impact Bonds in the United States: 
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In 2015, recognizing the emerging financial tool as a creative means of 
effectuating positive social change, the Richmond City Council opted to 
allocate approximately $3 million in Social Impact Bonds to rehabilitate 
abandoned residential neighborhoods across the region. 212  The project 
represents the first time SIBs have been used to remedy deteriorating 
neighborhoods.213 Under the agreement, Mechanics Bank, the commercial 
lender, will provide the $3 million that the Richmond Community 
Foundation, the nonprofit service provider, will use to acquire, rehabilitate, 
or otherwise improve blighted properties.214 Relying on data which showed 
that each abandoned house or property cost the city approximately $7,000 
per year in abatement costs and highly sought after property tax revenue, 
the city reasoned that the SIB would benefit all partners involved.215 Likely 
resulting in repayment for the private investor while ensuring an increase in 
surrounding property values, the financing tool would thereby benefit the 
community as a whole. As stated by the Chief Financial Officer of 
Richmond’s Mechanics Bank, “SIBs may not provide the strongest financial 
return in the short run, but they’re an investment in the future of [a] 
community that pays dividends in far more important ways than cash.”216 
D. Social Impact Bond in Metro St. Louis  
Like the City of Richmond, St. Louis City would greatly benefit from a 
Social Impact Bond dedicated to the revitalization of its most blighted or 
neglected neighborhoods. Having siloed TIF to neighborhoods likely to turn 
a profit in the form of increased sales and property tax revenue, St. Louis 
needs to find alternative means by which the city may eradicate blight and 
thereby save neighborhoods from the social, health, and safety 
consequences of deteriorating properties.217 Unlike the program introduced 
in Richmond, however, St. Louis may benefit from a program committed 
 
212. See Hatti Hamlin, Mechanics Bank Purchases Richmond’s First Social Impact Bonds, 
PRWEB (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.prweb.com/releases/2015/11/prweb13099137.htm [https://perma 
.cc/S7EN-NPYH]; Richmond Housing Renovation Program, RCF CONNECTS, https://www.rcfconnects. 
org/community-initiatives/restoring-neighborhoods/richmond-housing-renovation-program/ [https://pe 
rma.cc/R3GZ-YQ9N].  
213. See Hamlin, supra note 213. 
214. See id.  
215. Id. 
216. Id.  
217. “Where you live in St. Louis has a powerful impact on your health. Residents of zip codes 
separated by only few miles have up to an 18-year difference in life expectancy. Because of considerable 
residential segregation in St. Louis, many areas with high African American populations are also areas 
with concentrated poverty and poor health. These neighborhoods often lack resources like healthy foods, 
safe green spaces for recreation, and convenient access to medical care.” WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, 
FOR THE SAKE OF ALL: A REPORT ON THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN ST. 
LOUIS AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR EVERYONE 5 (July 31, 2015), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/sites. 












not only to vacant properties, but to neighborhoods that have been sidelined 
and undermined by way of implicit and explicit racial zoning and neglect. 
Surrounded by vacant tracts yet struggling to remain within their 
neighborhoods, families living in deteriorating neighborhoods must combat 
meager property appraisals, lacking public services due to low sales 
revenue, and negligible property tax revenue.218 To implement an evidence-
based program premised on neighborhood revitalization, initiators of the 
SIB may consider alternative means of measuring program success, 
monitoring for changes in not only property valuation and sales tax revenue, 
but also for positive health outcomes or a decrease in local crime rates, 
either of which may relieve the government of great financial burdens.  
Success of a St. Louis SIB intended to remediate the negative 
consequences of decades-long neglect hinges on the collaboration of several 
St. Louis partners. A SIB generally requires “a government partner, an 
investor, an intermediary, a service provider, and an independent 
evaluator.”219 In the St. Louis City SIB, these entities might include the 
city’s Alderpersons or Mayor alongside the Planning Department220 or an 
alternative city department dedicated to the revitalization of St. Louis 
neighborhoods, a prominent financial institution such as U.S. Bank or Bank 
of America, the Affordable Housing Trust Fund Coalition,221 or Rise,222 as 
well as local philanthropists 223  willing to partially repay the primary 
investor if the program fails. Together, these partners can advance an 
evidence-based program that provides solutions to communities 
traditionally underserved by the municipalities of the St. Louis region.  
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X].  
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223. See Lea Konczal, St. Louis’ Biggest Corporate Philanthropists - Large Companies, ST. 
LOUIS BUS. J. (Mar. 25, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/subscriber-only/2018/11/ 
09/st-louis-biggest-corporate.html [https://perma.cc/SP4L-XTKE].  












When first introduced to St. Louis residents, the Team Four Plan, and its 
underlying policy of urban triage, shook the city. Reprimanding the Plan for 
its overt endorsement of strategic neglect and corresponding disparate 
impact, public and local government officials rejected the Team Four Plan’s 
targeted approach, identifying the Plan’s policies as mere continuations of 
the racially restrictive real estate practices endorsed throughout the 
twentieth century. An analysis of modern St. Louis, however, demonstrates 
the degree to which the Team Four Plan, while never officially adopted, has 
been embraced by local municipalities in the form of a modern segregation 
tool—the Missouri TIF statute. Misused across the region, the legislation, 
though posited as a mechanism for eradicating blight across the state, has 
served to effectuate Team Four’s most powerful vision by neglecting truly 
blighted neighborhoods in favor of commercial and residential development 
for neighborhoods on the brink of tangible economic success. Upheld by the 
courts and recent legislation, the Act has enabled municipalities’ 
mistreatment of low-income and largely African American neighborhoods 
and provides little hope for future use modifications. As such, this Note 
proposes the implementation of a blight-focused Social Impact Bond, 
suggesting that private investment replace public hesitation in dealing with 
deteriorating regions across the city. By way of initial private investment, 
local municipalities will be able to target neighborhoods most vulnerable to 
impending blight and rampant vacancy without fear of political backlash or 
financial restraints, thereby working with private parties to effect true 
change in the City of St. Louis. 
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